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Will	the	independence	of	the	Bank	of	England	fall	as	a
consequence	of	Brexit?
Will	central	bank	independence	in	the	UK	fall	as	a	consequence	of	Brexit?	As	Hjalte	Lokdam	(LSE)
explains,	Brexit	represents	a	political	shift	that	is	likely	to	affect	the	structure	of	the	British	governmental
apparatus.	The	role	of	the	executive	will	undoubtedly	be	strengthened,	and	if	the	already	considerable
difficulties	associated	with	exiting	the	EU	are	compounded	by	a	recession,	an	either	Conservative	or
Labour	government	may	find	it	expedient	to	thwart	the	independence	of	the	UK’s	central	bank.
Will	central	bank	independence	in	the	UK,	as	some	have	predicted,	fall	as	a	consequence	of	Brexit?	Given	the
general	uncertainties	clouding	HM	government’s	‘plans’	for	Brexit	and	beyond,	the	obvious	answer	is,	as	ever	when	it
comes	to	Brexit,	who	knows?	While	it	is	impossible	to	answer	the	question	with	any	degree	of	confidence,	some
considerations	as	to	whether	there	is	a	relationship	between	Brexit	and	the	independence	of	the	Bank	are
nevertheless	worthwhile.	Brexit	represents	a	shift	in	the	dynamics	of	British	politics,	a	shift	that	is	likely	to	affect	also
the	structure	of	the	British	governmental	apparatus.	Since	the	Bank	of	England	forms	part	of	this,	its	status	may	be
subject	to	reconsideration;	if	not	in	the	immediate	context	of	Brexit,	then	in	the	difficult	and	drawn-out	process	of
reconstituting	the	institutional	architecture	of	the	British	state	that	is	sure	to	follow	whatever	deal	is	(not)	struck
between	the	UK	and	the	EU.
The	most	immediate	answer	to	the	question	is,	nevertheless:	why	should	it?	The	Bank’s	independence	is,	after	all,
not	a	product	of	EU	law	but	based	on	an	act	of	Parliament.	Yes,	central	bank	independence	is	enshrined	in	the	EU
Treaties.	But	the	British	opt-out	from	the	Economic	and	Monetary	Union	means	that	the	UK	is	and	always	has	been
free	to	do	as	it	pleases	with	its	central	bank	as	far	as	the	EU	is	concerned.	Like	many	other	central	banks	around	the
world,	the	Bank	was	made	independent	in	the	1990s.	Both	the	European	Central	Bank’s	and	the	Bank	of	England’s
independence	were	products	of	the	same	ideological	winds	that	swept	the	world	of	central	banking	at	the	time	and
which	remain	powerful	in	both	mainstream	economics	and	monetary	policy-making.	In	the	UK,	Blair	and	New	Labour
took	credit	for	making	the	Bank	independent,	but	the	transition	had	already	been	prepared	under	Major.	In	the	two
decades	since	then,	central	bank	independence	has	been,	more	or	less,	a	non-issue	in	both	main	parties.	Why	then,
should	Brexit	affect	the	Bank’s	independence?	If	Parliament	so	desired,	it	could	and	can	alter	the	status	of	the	Bank
as	it	sees	fit	and	Brexit	should	not,	in	principle,	have	any	bearing	on	the	matter.	Changing	perspectives	within	the
political	parties	might,	but	not	Brexit	as	such.
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A	more	politically	thorny	question	is	what	effect	the	anti-elite	and	anti-expert	impetus	of	the	Brexit	vote	will	have	on	central
bank	independence	in	the	future.	Memorably,	the	independent	judges	of	the	High	Court	in	the	Miller	case	were	branded
‘enemies	of	the	people’	by	the	Brexit	media		Similarly,	economic	experts,	including	the	Bank	itself,	who	have	published	or
otherwise	expressed	concerns	about	the	state	of	the	UK	economy	following	Brexit	have	been	lamented	for	not	respecting
the	people’s	vote	and	being	overly	pessimistic	and	so	on.	If	such	political	sentiments	become	the	order	of	the	day,
central	bank	independence	might	well	be	threatened.	However,	while	the	UK	has	seen	Brexit	emerge	as	a	more	or
less	‘empty	signifier’	uniting	disparate	and	often	contradictory	political	claims	and	grievances,	such	critiques	of
independence	and	expertise,	in	general,	are	independent	of	the	UK’s	the	legal	and	political	divorce	from	the	EU.	In	recent
years,	populist	movements	across	the	world	have	worked	to	stifle	the	independence	of	a	number	of	the	traditional	pillars	of
liberal	democracy:	the	press	and	the	judiciary	most	conspicuously,	of	course,	but	also	central	banks,	which	are	increasingly
also	included	in	the	pantheon	of	the	guardians	of	the	liberal	order.	While	the	Bank’s	pro-remain	stance	may	make	it	an
obvious	target	of	populist	resentment,	this	is	not	the	effect	of	Brexit	as	such.	Rather,	both	Brexit	and	the	threat	to	central
bank	independence	are	probably	consequences	of	political	dynamics	that	have	emerged	in	a	wide	number	of	countries.
Their	consequences	more	broadly	are	probably	also	much	more	sinister	than	the	end	of	central	bank	independence	alone.
More	moderate	political	voices	have	also	raised	concerns	about	the	current	status	of	central	bank	independence.
This,	however,	has	nothing	to	do	with	Brexit	but	rather	with	the	fact	that	the	Financial	Crisis	saw	the	power	of	central
banks	grow	tremendously;	without	an	equivalent	growth	of	democratic	oversight	of	their	activities,	that	is.	Central
bank	independence,	according	to	people	like	Ed	Balls,	should	not	be	abolished	but	reformed	to	account	for	changes
in	central	bank	practice.	Such	moderate	voices	of	the	role	of	central	banks	in	society	should	hardly	be	characterized
as	a	threat	to	central	bank	independence.
The	conclusion	seems	to	be	that	whatever	central	bank	independence	may	be	threatened	by,	in	the	UK	and	beyond,
it	is	probably	not	Brexit	as	such.	This,	however,	may	be	too	hasty	a	conclusion.	The	EU	may	not	have	required	the
independence	of	the	Bank,	but	it	is	itself	an	elaborate	structure	of	independent	governmental	authorities.	As	a
number	of	prominent	scholars,	including	the	Irish	political	scientist	Peter	Mair	and	the	French	sociologist	Antoine
Vauchez,	have	noted,	the	EU	is	to	large	extent	governed	on	the	basis	of	the	principles	of	independence	and
expertise.	Concentrating	decision-making	with	regard	to	issues	of	common	concern	in	independent	authorities	at	the
EU	level	can,	according	to	the	theory	behind	it,	make	the	achievement	of	shared	objectives	much	more	effective.
Presumably,	Brexit	would	mean	the	repatriation	of	a	number	of	those	powers	(‘take	back	control’).	But	as	the	conflict
over	the	distribution	of	those	powers	between	the	devolved	governments	and	Westminster	attests	to,	the	question	of
how	to	do	so	is	unresolved.	Such	issues	are	difficult	not	least	because	EU	membership	has	arguably	amounted	to	a
quite	extensive	constitutional	transformation	of	the	UK;	a	‘(surreptitious)	constitutional	modernisation,’	in	the	words	of
Martin	Louglin.
Brexit	is	thus	bound	to	have	tremendous	consequences	for	the	way	in	which	the	exercise	of	governmental	power	is
organized.	On	current	indications,	the	direction	of	such	change	seems	to	be	towards	centralization	in	Whitehall
departments,	at	least	in	a	transitional	phase.	Furthermore,	it	is	not	only	the	institutional	make-up	of	the	British	state
that	is	put	into	question	but	also	the	UK	economy	and	its	growth	model.	Reconstructing	the	political	and	material
constitution	after	Brexit	is	bound	to	be	a	drawn-out	process;	a	state	of	exception	of	sorts	in	which	the	role	of
executive	power	is	emphasised	(e.g.	through	Henry	VIII-clauses).	If	the	already	considerable	difficulties	associated
with	this	process	are	compounded	by	a	post-Brexit	recession	of	some	magnitude,	it	is	not	obvious	that	a	sitting
government,	whether	Conservative	or	Labour,	will	find	central	bank	independence	conducive	to	achieving	its	aims.	In
that	sense,	Brexit	might	indeed	constitute	a	threat	to	central	bank	independence.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	
Hjalte	Lokdam	is	a	PhD	candidate	in	political	economy	at	the	LSE’s	European	Institute.
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